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THE SUBSTANCE OF EQUALITY 
Jeremy Waldron* 
SPEAKING OF EQUALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RHETORICAL 
FORCE OF "EQUALITY" IN MORAL AND LEGAL DISCOURSE. By Pe-
ter Westen. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1990. Pp. xxi, 
318. $39.50. 
What do the following cases have in common? 
(1) A previously undemocratic country is about to expand its 
franchise so that all adult citizens have the right to vote. However, the 
suggestion is made that, because people with a college education have a 
greater knowledge of the world and deeper insight into public affairs, 
their votes should count double in any election. 
(2) The constitution of a country gives its citizens the right to assem-
ble peacefully to petition the government for redress of grievances. But 
the society is racially divided. When groups of white citizens assemble, 
their demonstrations are undisturbed; when groups of black citizens as-
semble, the police always break up their meetings, ostensibly "in the in-
terests of public order." 
(3) In Israel, during recent Iraqi missile attacks, gas masks are is-
sued to all citizens. But gas masks are not issued to those who live in the 
"Occupied Territories" such as the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, even 
though some Iraqi missiles have landed in these areas. When chal-
lenged, the government says there are not enough masks to go around. 
(4) In an American city, only ten percent of recent recruits to the 
police department are women. Partly this is because few women apply. 
But a smaller proportion are admitted of those who do apply (than the 
proportion of successful male applicants) because fewer women satisfy 
the minimum height requirement. 
One thing these cases have in common is that they all seem to 
involve inequality. Case (1) involves an inequality of political rights. 
On the basis of claims about differential ability, various electors are 
made unequal in the political power assigned to their votes. In case 
(2), it is civil rights that are at stake: although blacks and whites are 
given the same rights by the constitution, their demonstrations are not 
treated equally by the police. Case (3) could be described as an issue 
of "equal protection." All inhabitants of the country are endangered 
by chemical attacks. But the government is offering protection only to 
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its citizens; it is ignoring the equal needs of its "subjects" in the Occu-
pied Territories. In case (4), critics of the police department's hiring 
practices are likely to say that the height restriction discriminates 
against women, and that women's abilities and interests have not 
equally been taken into account in formulating the various tests and 
restrictions for entry into this career. 
The language of "equality" and "inequality," then, seems appro-
priate in the discussion of these cases. But that language can be frus-
tratingly mercurial in its application. In each of these examples, the 
policy complained of as "unequal" could be defended on grounds of 
equality. Case ( 4) involves the equal application of a recruitment stan-
dard: male applicants who fall short of the height restriction are not 
treated any differently from short women. Similarly, with case (3): 
since there are not enough masks to go round, some criterion has to be 
used to determine who gets a mask and who does not. As far as one 
can tell, the relevant criterion - citizenship - has been equally and 
impartially administered. In case (2), the police department might ar-
gue that they are applying an equal standard of public order. In case 
(1), all citizens are equal in having a vote: no one is excluded from the 
franchise. 1 And all are equal in having the appropriate test applied to 
determine the weight to be assigned to their vote. The educational 
criterion, like the requirements in cases (3) and (4), is administered 
without fear or favor. 
Reflection on arguments like these can easily convince us that the 
language of equality is too elusive to settle anything in politics. Those 
who are made equal in one respect are often thereby made unequal in 
another. Whatever one's political principles, it is easy to describe their 
fair application as equal and to condemn the application of one's oppo-
nents' principles as unequal. The important debate, therefore, should 
focus on the content of the principles themselves, not the real meaning 
of "equality." The language of equality is a rhetorical cover under 
which political claims are advanced and contested; but it very seldom 
captures the substance of those political claims in any clear or interest-
ing way. 
That is the thesis of Peter W esten's book, Speaking of Equality. 
Although he insists at the end of the book that he himself is "deeply 
committed to many of the social causes that are commonly advanced 
in the name of equality, including rights for women, nondiscrimina-
tion on the basis of race, and redistribution of wealth" {p. 287), the 
bulk of his argument is designed to show that the term "equality" is so 
ambiguous, and the concept of equality so equivocal and contested, 
that the mere fact of its occurrence in a political context tells us next 
1. The proposal, and this defense of it, can be found in J. MILL, Considerations on Represen-
tative Government, in 19 COLLECTED WORKS 371, 474-475 (J. Robson ed. 1977). 
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to nothing about the content or the justification of the claim that is 
being advanced. 
In this review, I do four things. In Part I, I examine Westen's 
argument that we should always look below the surface of "equality" 
rhetoric to the substantial claims of principle that are doing the real 
work in moral and political debate. I show that this is an important 
argument, and that it helps to clarify much of what is going on in the 
modem discussion of discrimination. 
In Part II, however, I criticize W esten's implicit suggestion that 
arguments about appropriate principles are never themselves based on 
the idea of equality. According to Westen, talk of "equality" and "in-
equality" is always a surface phenomenon in politics; it can always be 
parsed out in favor of more direct discussion of what principles should 
determine who gets what in the way of goods, powers, and liberties. 
But I shall argue that we must often revert to the idea of equality -
particularly the idea of equal human worth, or the right to equal con-
cern and respect - as a basis for arguing about which principles are 
appropriate and which inappropriate to govern such distributions. 
In Part III, I examine Westen's explanation of why we persist in 
using the language of equality. He claims that people gain considera-
ble rhetorical advantage through the deployment of this terminology, 
and he tries to account for that advantage largely in terms of the ambi-
guities, connotations, and resonances of the words that people use. 
Some of his explanations are more convincing than others. But I sug-
gest that in general his account is undermined by its failure to consider 
the substantive power of the egalitarian considerations discussed in the 
second part of the review. 
Finally, in Part IV, I make some comments about the omissions in 
W esten's book- the way it avoids engagement with substantive social 
issues, and the way it also neglects some important analytical ques-
tions about the meaning of the terms "equal" and "unequal." 
Throughout, I want to emphasize a general point about the nature 
of political theory. Westen makes a lot of the fact that the word 
"equality" and its verbal meaning are unhelpful guides to the nature 
and content of egalitarian ideals. I argue that this is an overly legalis-
tic approach to political principles. "Equality," like "liberty" and 
"fraternity," is a shorthand slogan but not an abbreviation. It evokes 
a particular range of moral considerations and a particular set of com-
plex arguments, and it does that, not by virtue of its meaning, but 
because every political theorist is familiar with a tradition of argumen-
tation in and around certain texts and doctrines and knows that col-
leagues can be alerted to the possible relevance of that tradition by 
using that simple word. In some contexts, the precise formulation of a 
principle is important. But often in political theory, that is less impor-
tant than the open-ended exploration of ideas and intimations, pinned 
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down no more precisely than is necessary to allow discussion to 
proceed. 
I 
Westen begins by distinguishing what he calls "descriptive equal-
ity" and "prescriptive equality." Although equality is usually put for-
ward prescriptively as an ideal, the use of the concept almost always 
involves some factual claims about the world. I shall use the example 
of case (1), outlined above, as an illustration. Suppose a liberal objects 
to the idea of plural voting by demanding that people be made equal in 
their right to vote. It is likely, first, that this demand will rest on or 
presuppose some descriptive statement to the effect that people are 
equal in their possession of certain qualities (such as rationality and 
judgment), in virtue of which the demand for a vote is justified. Sec-
ondly, the liberal's prescriptive demand (that· people ought to have an 
equal vote) is given its critical edge by the belief that, as a matter of 
fact, the political arrangements in the society in question (actual or 
suggested) do not give people what they ought to have. Thus the pre-
scriptive demand brings two factual or descriptive claims into relation 
with one another. It takes a descriptive claim about what people are 
actually like: 
(A) People are equal in their rationality. 
It then relates that claim critically to a second descriptive claim, this 
time a claim about a certain political system: 
(B) In this system, people's votes are given unequal weight. 
The relation between (A) and (B) is critical, in virtue of the general 
prescriptive principle: 
(C) Weight ought to be assigned to people's votes on the basis of 
their rationality. 
Together propositions (A), (B), and (C) entail the prescriptive 
conclusion: 
(D) Therefore this voting system ought to be changed. 
Westen makes a number of interesting points about the relation 
between these statements. He notes first that even taken by them-
selves, claims like (A) and (B) are descriptively ambiguous. To say 
that two items are equal is to draw attention to the fact that they have 
been measured and compared against a common standard, and found 
to be indistinguishable by reference to that standard (p. 52). And to 
say that they are unequal is to say that they are distinguishable by 
reference to some such standard. So the first ambiguity, in the case of 
simple descriptions of equality and inequality, concerns the specifica-
tion of the standard against which the measurement is being made. 
Things that are equal in length are not necessarily equal in weight. In 
the case of (A) and (B), the standards are actually mentioned in the 
statements. In (A), the standard is that of rationality; in (B), it is a 
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matter of the weight a vote is given in relation to other votes cast in an 
election. 
However, another ambiguity remains. Once the standard is given, 
equality and inequality are matters of comparison and dist-
inguishability. But what is "distinguishable" is not a determinate mat-
ter of fact. Whether two quantities are distinguishable has to do with 
the nature of the measuring process we are using, and in particular the 
margin of error in our measurements (p. 37). Two objects measured 
on a fine scientific balance may weigh 15.71 ounces and 16.01 ounces, 
respectively; yet a crude grocer's scale will indicate that they both 
weigh one pound. Which scale we use depends, obviously enough, on 
our purpose in making the measurement. This point is particularly 
important with regard to a statement like (A). Certainly, some meas-
ures of rationality (such as IQ tests) will reveal great differences 
among adult citizens. When we claim nevertheless that they are all 
equal in their rationality, we are indicating our belief that the purpose 
for which we are comparing them does not require the fine distinctions 
that such tests would indicate; for our purposes (in arguing about the 
franchise) a crude measure that simply indicates whether or not a per-
son has the capacity to reason will be sufficient. So if a defender of the 
proposal mooted in case (1) denies the truth of statement (A), it is not 
likely to be because he disagrees with us on the facts. What he dis-
agrees about is the way we make the measurement and the compari-
son, and in particular the very considerable margin of error we 
(liberals) think it appropriate to use. 
Much the same can be said of (B). Whether or not people's votes 
have equal weight may depend on the scale we use. "Equal in the 
number of votes needed to outweigh it" is one thing; "having an equal 
likelihood of affecting the outcome" is another.2 And given one or 
other of these scales, our margin of error may be more or less 
fastidious. 
According to Westen, the distinction between descriptive and pre-
scriptive equality is that "the standards of comparison that underlie 
descriptive equalities are standards for comparing people and things 
solely with respect to what they actually are, as opposed to how they 
ought to be treated" (pp. 65-66). But this is confusing. On the one 
hand, any comparing of people or things is done for a reason, and, as 
we have seen, the reason for doing it will determine what properties 
we are measuring, what scale we are using, and what margin of error 
we allow. Any assertion of descriptive equality has some point to it, 
and that point is a matter of what, prescriptively, we are to do with the 
things we are comparing in the light of our comparisons. 
2. It is often claimed, for example, that votes are unequal, in the second sense, in electoral 
systems that are not based on proportional representation. For a discussion, see C. BEITZ, 
PoLmCAL EQUALITY 123-40 (1989). 
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On the other hand, as we have seen, any prescription of equality 
requires us to engage in certain descriptive investigations. If we say 
that two quantities ought to be equal, we are committed to an investi-
gation of a claim like (B), an investigation of whether they are equal 
(in order to see if anything needs to be done, in the light of our pre-
scription). And often when we say that two quantities ought to be 
equal, we rest the assertion on some prescriptive principle, such as (C), 
whose application will then require a factual investigation of the truth 
of some other descriptive claim, like (A), as well. 
It would have been simpler, then, if Westen had distinguished be-
tween states of affairs, like (B), that are being criticized in some pre-
scription, and states of affairs, like (A), whose existence is asserted as a 
reason for the prescription. He could then have said that it is a de-
scriptive matter of fact whether the latter state of affairs obtains or 
not, and that it is also a descriptive matter of fact whether or not the 
state of affairs called for (in the light of that) has actually been brought 
about. He could next have mentioned that what is prescriptive here is 
the connection between (A) and (B) - the connection between the 
state of affairs being called for and the state of affairs in the light of 
which that call is made. And then he could add finally that it is our 
prescriptive sense of that connection that explains the scales of mea-
surement and the margins of error that we are willing to deploy in 
determining whether the descriptive equalities actually obtain or not. 
This would not produce a simple distinction between descriptive 
equalities and prescriptive equalities. But it would nevertheless sim-
plify a confusing and enormously complicated discussion that domi-
nates a large part of W esten's book. 
The underlying point that Westen really wants to make would also 
be much clearer. In a claim about political equality, what really mat-
ters is the underlying prescriptive principle, such as, 
(C) Weight should be assigned to people's votes on the basis of their 
rationality. 
Only because we accept this judgment do we think it important to 
determine whether or not (A) is true, and, on the basis of that, 
whether or not (B) is true of some political system as it stands. 
Now the interesting thing about (C) is that it is formulated without 
reference to equality at all. If we think weight should be assigned to 
votes on the basis of rationality, we will think it important to deter-
mine how (if at all) people differ in their rationality. If (A) is true, 
then (C) will command an equal assignment of weight. If (A) is false, 
then (C) commands an unequal assignment. Equality or inequality in 
the political sphere are contingent artifacts of applying to the real 
world a standard that, in itself, has nothing to do with equality. 
The same seems to be true of several of the other cases we men-
tioned. Consider case (2) - the right to assemble peacefully. 
1356 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:1350 
Although we can imagine a complaint from black demonstrators that 
they are not being treated equally with whites, the real substance of 
their demand is for the simple recognition of their right. They have 
grievances to air, they are citizens, and they want recognition of their 
right to demonstrate. They would not be satisfied by equal recogni-
tion, if equality meant that blacks and whites alike were banned from 
demonstrating. That would be like the example Westen quotes from 
William Frankena: "If a ruler were to boil his subjects in oil, jumping 
in afterward himself, it would be an injustice, but there would be no 
inequality of treatment."3 Equality and inequality are not really the 
issue in such cases; the intrinsic wrongness of the treatment is the fo-
cus of the complaint. 
Cases (1) and (2) also illustrate an interesting distinction that Wes-
ten discusses between "comparative" and "noncomparative" stan-
dards. 4 A noncomparative standard is one that entitles each person to 
some good or liberty by virtue of possessing some feature or character-
istic: "Anyone who is a citizen has the right to demonstrate peace-
fully." If P and Q are both citizens, then P has the right to 
demonstrate (because P is a citizen) and Q has the right to demon-
strate (because Q is a citizen). Although they both end up with a simi-
lar liberty, the equality or similarity is incidental. Q has a right to a 
liberty which is similar to that afforded P, because Q, like P, is a citi-
zen, not because it is important for Q and P to be treated the same. 
With comparative principles, by contrast, what matters for a given 
person is the relation between what she gets and what others get. We 
usually think about voting this way. Since the value of someone's vote 
is the difference it makes in an election in which other people also cast 
their votes, anyone concerned to get a vote will be deeply interested in 
whether her vote has the same weight as that of other electors. The 
idea of a comparison matters here in a way that it does not matter in 
the case of the right to demonstrate. For the latter case, universal-
izability5 really does all the work that equality appears to do. 
But although he notices this difference, Westen rightly points out 
that comparative principles need not involve an essential reference to 
3. P. 90. The quotation is from William Frankena. Frankena, The Concept of Social Justice, 
in SOCIAL JUSTICE 17 (R. Brandt ed. 1962). 
4. P. 72. The distinction was first introduced by Joel Feinberg in his article, Noncomparative 
Justice, 83 PHIL. REv. 297-338 (1974). 
5. A judgment about some particular case is universalizable if and only if the person making 
the judgment is prepared to make the same judgment about any other case that is relevantly 
similar, and only if his criterion of relevant similarity is not dictated by the conclusion he wants 
to reach about the particular case in question. If the one redheaded guest at a party announces 
that he should receive a double helping of cake because redheads should always get more, we will 
suspect that his judgment is not really universalizable. He has selected redheadedness as his 
criterion of relevant similarity only because it benefits him in this particular case. See R. HARE, 
FREEDOM AND REASON (1963); J. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 83-102 
(1977). 
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equality. A principle like (C), above, requires us to make compari-
sons: it requires us to compare people's rationality, and it then re-
quires us to compare the weight that is assigned to their votes. The 
latter comparison is, in Robert Nozick's phrase, to be "patterned" on 
the former comparison.6 Now, if we like, we can say with Aristotle 
that what the principle requires is an equality between the proportion 
of P's rationality to Q's rationality and the proportion of the weight 
assigned to P's vote and the weight assigned to Q's vote. 7 But strictly 
speaking, talk of equality is redundant here. What (C) calls for is sim-
ple proportionality. As Westen notes, the normatively significant step 
is always what should be proportionate to what, and that is something 
"about which the mathematical notion of proportional equality has 
nothing to say" (p. 57). 
So far, Westen has shown that many cases that appear to involve 
issues of equality do not really involve equality at all. In issues of 
noncomparative justice, what matters is finding and applying the right 
principle for the assignment of individual rights. And in issues of 
comparative justice, what matters is that we find a principle that di-
rects us to make the appropriate comparisons and establish the appro-
priate proportion (for example, of votes to rationality) on the basis of 
those comparisons. 
Westen argues that a similar approach can be taken to all antidis-
crimination and "disparate impact" law. Consider case (4), outlined 
earlier: the case of the height requfrement for recruitment into the 
police force. On the face of it, the height requirement is neutral be-
tween the sexes. But we know it has an unequal impact on women: on 
average, women are a few inches shorter than men. Some say that this 
poses a dilemma about the meaning of "equa:l treatment." Men and 
women are to be treated equally in things like police recruitment, but 
commentators differ as to whether "equal treatment" prohibits the 
adoption of criteria that have disproportionate impact, or whether it 
prohibits only the use of criteria that are intended to disadvantage pro-
tected groups. s 
But Westen argues that the debate is best understood in terms that 
have nothing to do with the concept of equal treatment. His point is 
worth quoting at length: 
The controversy over disparate impact is not about the meaning of equal 
treatment. Rather, it is about the rules by which equal treatment should 
be measured. If a facially neutral rule is a legally relevant standard for 
assessing the treatment of all the people to whom it applies (that is, if the 
6. See R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 155-60 (1974). 
7. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1131-a (D. Ross ed. 1980). 
8. Westen (p. 109) cites Friedman, Redefining Equality, Discrimination and Affirmative Ac-
tion under Title VIL· The Access Principle, 65 TEXAS L. REv. 41, 60-61 (1986), and Rutherglen, 
Disparate Impact under Title VII, 73 VA. L. REv. 1297, 1311 (1987), respectively, as representa-
tives of these points of view. 
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rule is a legally appropriate measure of how all such people ought to be 
treated), applying the rule necessarily treats them equally as measured 
by the baseline of the rule. Conversely, if a facially neutral rule is a 
legally inappropriate measure of the way some of the people to whom it 
applies ought to be treated, then applying the rule treats them unequally 
by reference to the baseline of how they ought to be treated, by giving 
some and denying others the treatments to which they are legally enti-
tled. It follows, therefore, that to complain of disparate impact is simply 
to assert that a given rule is an inappropriate - an unjust - measure of 
the way some of the people to whom it applies ought to be treated. [p. 
110] 
In other words, the real dispute in case (4) is whether or not there 
should be a height restriction for entry into the police force. This is to 
be debated in terms of the social desirability of having tall police of-
ficers, not in terms of the idea of equality. It is a virtue of Westen's 
analysis that it makes these points clear. 
II 
The central thesis of Westen's book is that political debates con-
ducted in terms of "equality" and "inequality" are often really debates 
about appropriate and inappropriate principles of distribution. Should 
the suffrage be conferred on the basis of rationality? Should some cer-
tain height be a requirement for recruitment into the police force? Do 
people have a right to demonstrate in public? These are the real is-
sues; "equality" is just a rhetorical smokescreen. 
But Westen says almost nothing about how these matters of princi-
ple are to be discussed. How are we to decide whether a minimum 
height should be a requirement for the police force? The answer usu-
ally given refers to "business necessity": whether the requirement is 
related to job performance.9 But necessity and relation to job per-
formance are not all-or-nothing matters. Perhaps, other things being 
equal, it is good to have tall officers. But maybe it is good, from a 
social point of view, to have a mix of men and women police officers as 
well. How "necessary" the height restriction is depends on how im-
portant the goals that it serves are, in relation to other social goals that 
could be served by recruiting shorter officers. In working through 
these issues, on a matter of public importance like police recruitment, 
we think it appropriate to appeal to criteria like "the common good," 
or "the maximization of utility."10 
Suppose, however, someone were to defend the use of the height 
9. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (cited by Westen at p. 109). 
10. That is clear in the context of public sector recruitment. In private sector cases, there are 
similar questions of degree. Is it enough for an employer to show that use of some criterion 
marginally enhances profitability? Or does he have to show that his business would go bankrupt 
ifhe did not use the criterion in question. Elsewhere I have argued that what is really going on in 
the context of private decisionmaking is a determination of how great a cost it is reasonable to 
expect private businesses to bear in the social struggle for equality. See Waldron, Indirect Dis-
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criterion on the ground that it helps to validate masculine values. One 
response to that defense might be that such a purpose is unacceptable 
because it does not take into account the interests of everyone in soci-
ety: the purpose benefits men, in regard to their self-image, but it does 
not promote the interests of men and women alike. In my view, it 
would be natural to express this objection to the "masculinist" defense 
in terms of equality: in advancing social justifications, we are required 
to accord equal concern to the interests of everyone in society. A case 
can be made that utilitarian criteria do that, but the "masculinist" de-
fense we are considering almost certainly does not. 
The example I have just given may seem a little contrived. I think 
the point can be illustrated more strikingly by reference to case (3), 
outlined earlier: the failure of the Israeli government to distribute gas 
masks to its subjects in the Occupied Territories. 
The example is not one that Westen discusses, but arguments like 
his can easily show that a simple requirement of equal treatment is 
unhelpful in this case. If there are not enough gas masks to make one 
available for each inhabitant of the state of Israel and its occupied 
territories, then there is no sense to any requirement that each person 
should receive the same number of gas masks. I I The only number 
capable of satisfying that formula would be zero. Since there are some 
gas masks, and since it is desirable to distribute them rather than with-
hold them from everyone (on grounds of equality), the question is 
"Who should receive a mask and who should not?" Various principles 
of priority might be suggested. The one the government acted on was 
this: 
(Pl) If gas masks are scarce, citizens are to have priority over 
noncitizens. 
But others can be imagined, for example: 
(P2) If gas masks are scarce, priority is to be given to those whose 
job it is to render aid to people who are victims of a missile attack. 
Or: 
(P3) If gas masks are scarce, priority is to be given to those who are 
otherwise most vulnerable to the effects of a missile attack. 
On Westen's view, the thing to do in a case like this is to choose the 
appropriate principle for distributing something that not everyone can 
have, not to haggle over the meaning of "equal protection." 
But how do we go about choosing a principle? In my view, the 
idea of equality - considered as a deep principle of political justifica-
tion - can provide some assistance here, even if the surface slogan 
crimination, in EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION: EssAYS IN FREEDOM AND JUSTICE 93, 99 (S. 
Guest & A. Milne eds. 1985). 
11. Though see Waldron, Rights ln Conflict, 99 ETHICS 503, 512 (1989), where I argue that, 
in the face of scarcity, a right to be given some good generates a secondary duty on the govern-
ment to obtain additional supplies of the good if it can. 
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"equal protection" cannot. Consider, for example, the choice between 
principles {Pl) and (P2). If some ambulance drivers, paramedics, 
peace officers, or civil defense rescue workers in the Occupied Territo-
ries are noncitizens, then (P2) will dictate a different distribution from 
{Pl). I can imagine someone arguing for (P2) as follows. Although 
(like any principle that applies to these circumstances) (P2) is going to 
have the result that some people get gas masks while others do not, the 
principle at least takes into account the interests of all those who are 
governed by the state which is making this decision. Everyone has an 
interest in receiving medical and civil defense aid in the event of an 
attack, and so everyone has an interest in the health and availability of 
the emergency personnel. Given that some people are going to have to 
do without gas masks, the distributive principle should appeal to their 
interests as well. (P2) does this, because for any given person who is 
denied a gas mask, the chance of that person surviving a chemical 
attack is somewhat enhanced if masks are distributed according to 
(P2) than if they are distributed according to any other principle. 
Now perhaps this is not a conclusive argument. What concerns 
me is the range of interests which its justification takes into account. 
The justification of {P2) purports to serve the interests of every indi-
vidual (citizen or subject) affected by the government's decision. A 
similar case cannot be made for (Pl). Confining the distribution of gas 
masks to citizens does not seem to benefit, or to have any probability 
of benefiting, noncitizens at all. A person who argues in favor of (P 1) 
may say that he has considered the interests of all in arriving at his 
decision. But it is a sense of "considered" that is quite different from 
that involved in the defense of (P2). The proponent of (Pl) will have 
run his finger down the list of people whose interests are at stake -
citizens and subjects alike - and as he passes each name, he "consid-
ers" whether to benefit that person or not. Having considered all the 
interests, he decides to benefit only those who are citizens. The other 
interests have been "considered" but denied. 
What about the contrast between (Pl) and (P3)? By (P3), those in 
particular need (for example, those who do not have access to sealed 
rooms) are given priority over those who are less vulnerable. Isn't this 
making exactly the same sort of discrimination as (Pl), only on a 
somewhat different basis? No. In fact, a powerful argument can be 
made in support of (P3) on the basis of equal concern. Our fundamen-
tal aim is that all should have the same protection from chemical at-
tack. Suppose the population, before the issuing of gas masks, divides 
into two classes - the more vulnerable and the less vulnerable. Those 
in the latter class have a ten percent chance of suffering harm in the 
event of a chemical attack: they can lock themselves in a sealed room 
and only a direct hit will affect them. Those who have no sealed room 
(because they are homeless or their homes are dilapidated) have a fifty 
percent chance of suffering harm in the event of an attack. By issuing 
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gas masks to them, we can reduce their vulnerability to somewhere 
near the ten percent level of their more fortunate neighbors. A com-
mitment to the equal protection of interests therefore argues for a dis-
tribution on the basis of (P3).12 
What are we to say, then, about the relation between (P2) and 
(P3)? Both are supported by arguments based on equal concern, but 
they still compete as principles of distribution. There is no ready an-
swer. Choosing between them requires complicated argumentation 
about which distributive criterion better serves the principle of equal 
concern. Some aspects of that argument will be consequentialist: are 
the interests of the vulnerable better served by issuing them gas masks 
or by assuring paramedical assistance? Some aspects will involve 
deeper issues about how to conceive "equal concern." Is utilitarian 
maximization an appropriate expression of equal concern (because it 
considers all preferences and assigns them equal weight)? Or does 
equal concern demand a different social welfare function: equaliza-
tion, for example, or Rawlsian maximin? As Ronald Dworkin has ar-
gued, the principle of equal concern and respect is heavily contested in 
political theory.13 But that does not mean it is empty. We have al-
ready seen how it works to exclude some criteria, like (Pl). 
Westen says very little about this approach. He does, however, 
briefly discuss Dworkin's distinction between "treatment as an equal" 
and "equal treatment" (pp. 102-08). In a famous example, Dworkin 
suggested that a parent with two children, one of whom is dying from 
a disease that is making the other merely uncomfortable, does not 
treat them as equals if he flips a coin to decide who should receive the 
remaining dose of medicine.14 By flipping the coin, he gives them in a 
sense equal treatment, since each has the same probability of receiving 
the drug. But to distribute the probabilities in this way is to violate a 
deeper duty of equal concern for their needs (along lines suggested by 
our argument for (P3)). To this, Westen responds that Dworkin is not 
really distinguishing between two egalitarian ideas. Instead, he is sim-
ply indicating his preference for one distributive principle over an-
other. If I think it appropriate to flip coins in cases like this, I should 
apply the coin-flipping rule equally; and if I think it appropriate to 
distribute medicine according to need, I should apply that rule 
equally. It is the same concept of equality, Westen argues, only it is 
applied to different principles (p. 105). 
Westen's point is correct but superficial. It leaves open the possi-
bility that.a rule distributing medicine according to need may be easier 
12. This is an adaptation of an argument by Gregory Vlastos. Vlastos, Justice and Equality, 
in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 41, 49-51 (J. Waldron ed. 1984). 
13. See generally. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 226-29 (1977); Dworkin, Lib-
eralism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113, 127-40 (S. Hampshire ed. 1978). 
14. R. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 227. 
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to defend on the basis of a more fundamental commitment to equal 
concern than a coin-flipping rule. 
In a footnote, Westen echoes Joseph Raz's suggestion that the idea 
of equality is redundant in Dworkin's principle of equal concern and 
respect (pp. 102-03): 
[W]hen Dworkin talks of a right to equal concern and respect, he really 
has in mind a right to concern and respect. He adds "equal" to indicate 
that none has a greater right than another; but this again follows not 
from any conception of equality but from the fact that he is here refer-
ring to a group with equal claim to have the right .... is 
That may be true. But in political philosophy, the claim that people 
have a right to concern and respect in virtue of their humanity (their 
being human agents, moral persons, or whatever) has been advanced 
so often to counter claims about radical differences in human worth, it 
is not surprising that it has come to be characterized in terms of 
"equality." Its typical use is to argue against a common temptation to 
differentiate human rights on the basis of birth, ability, race, sex, or 
merit. 
Thus, for example, Gregory Vlastos notes that doctrines of equal 
human worth are characteristically put forward in the face of evident 
differences of merit. The whole purpose of the equal worth doctrine is 
to insist that there are limits to the appeals that may be made to differ-
ential merit in certain fundamental issues of morality. 16 Now I have 
no doubt of the syntactical capabilities of Raz and Westen; they can 
easily show how the same point could be made without breathing the 
word "equality" at all. But it is not at all clear why they should want 
to do that, or why it matters. 
At any rate, I think it a central defect of this book that the author 
does not address the possibility that some deep idea, conventionally 
labeled "equality" or "equal concern," might form the basis of many 
important arguments in politics favoring the choice of some distribu-
tive principles over others. There is no sustained discussion of Vlastos' 
doctrine of equal worth, 17 no sustained discussion of Bernard Wil-
liams' account of equality, 18 no real exploration at all of the suggestion 
that "equality" might be something other than a misleading word at 
the confusing surface of politics. 
This, as I say, is a serious omission, because such a deep principle 
of equality has the potential to explain a lot in our political thinking. 
Consider the four cases I outlined at the beginning of this review. We 
15. P. 103 n.10 (quoting Raz, Professor Dworkin's Theory of Rights, 26 POL. STUD. 123, 130 
(1978) (citation omitted)). 
16. Vlastos, supra note 12, at 51-60. 
17. Id. 
18. Williams, The Idea of Equality, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 110-19 (2d ser., 
P. Laslett & W. Runciman eds. 1962). Westen briefly refers to Williams' article but not in a way 
that addresses these issues. P. 266. 
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have already seen how a principle of equality explains some of our 
concerns about (3) and ( 4). In cases (2) and ( 4), we are dealing with 
issues of apparent discrimination on grounds of race and sex. Every-
one knows that sexual and racial differences have been used in the past 
to justify profound differences of treatment, rights, and social status. 
Racist and sexist institutions have involved the ranking of human be-
ings, the determination of how much each is worth in relation to the 
others, and the claim that the interests of some can be outweighed by 
the interests of others simply because the former are inferior. Here is 
an example, from an English philosopher writing about human per-
fectibility in 1907. 
I will now mention a case in which probably no one will hesitate. It is 
becoming tolerably obvious at the present day that all improvement in 
the social condition of the higher races of mankind postulates the exclu-
sion of competition with the lower races. That means that, sooner or 
later, the lower Well-being - it may be ultimately the very existence -
of countless Chinamen or negroes must be sacrificed that a higher life 
may be possible for a much smaller number of white men. 19 
There is nothing ironical about this passage, and indeed its author goes 
on to note that his perfectionist position is impossible to defend "upon 
the principle of equal consideration taken by itself."20 Reading it, we 
become aware how much of our modem political thinking rests on the 
profound denial of such rankings. As we become aware of that, we 
can see, I think, how natural it is to express that denial using the term 
"equality." Certainly, as Westen argues, we could formulate our con-
victions using different words. We could say that respect is due to 
humanity as such. But "equality" has the extra and important 
resonance of indicating the sort of heritage we are struggling against. 
We believe in a profound respect due to humanity, and we maintain 
that belief in the face of those who claim that humanity admits of 
degrees. 
Even in the first of our examples, plural voting, we can see how 
natural it is to express our apprehensions about giving greater weight 
to the votes of the educated in terms of a principle of equality. Of 
course people could be ranked in terms of their knowledge and intel-
lectual capacity. But the things we consider important are agency and 
the sheer ability to reason. They are capacities 'Yhose importance for 
certain purposes far outweighs the intellectual differences that might 
exist between people. As always, our commitment to the importance 
of these basic capacities can be expressed without using the word 
"equal." But "equality" is a useful term here all the same, rebutting as 
19. 1 H. RASHDALL, THE THEORY OF Gooo AND EVIL: A TREATISE ON MORAL PHILOSO-
PHY 238-39 (2d ed. 1924). This work was first published in 1907. Rashdall also appends a 
footnote: "The exclusion is far more difficult to justify in the case of people like the Japanese, 
who are equally civilized but have fewer wants than the Western." Id. at 239 n.1. 
20. Id. at 239. 
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it does from the outset any suggestion that what matters in politics is 
the ranking or differentiation of human knowledge and intelligence. 
I have gone on at length about this in my review, not because Wes-
ten argues against the position, but precisely because he does not make 
it one of the themes of his study. He simply fails to see that the lan-
guage of equality may be used to convey subtleties like these in the 
process of political justification. Because he thinks the only legitimate 
use of such language is to convey precise information about surface 
political positions, it is not surprising that he concludes that most of it 
is hopelessly ambiguous. 
III 
Even if Westen's main thesis were correct - that the language of 
"equality" is often redundant and unclear in political argument -
there would remain a puzzle about why people so frequently invoke it. 
Why, Westen asks, do arguments for equality put opposing arguments 
on the defensive? Why is it that to our ears "inequality" has the ring 
of injustice, unfairness, and discrimination (pp. 255-56)? Westen's 
subtitle suggests that the solution of this puzzle is one of the main 
items on his agenda (although in fact the positive explanation of the 
rhetoric of equality is confined to the final twenty pages of the book). 
Westen makes short work of the common view that, as a theoreti-
cal or philosophical matter, there is a "presumption" in favor of equal-
ity. He shows first that the presumption of equality is not an a priori 
principle, and that in particular it does not follow from the formal 
principle that requires like cases to be treated alike. Instead, the pre-
sumption operates in circumstances in which we are unsure which 
cases are (relevantly) like or unlike others (p. 236). 
An example may help clarify this. Suppose I come into the play-
room and find such havoc that it is clear some if not all of my four 
children have been misbehaving. Each of them pleads innocence and 
blames the others, but the evidence clearly indicates three who are 
guilty. Those three are sent to bed without any tea. The fourth child 
presents a problem. It is simply not clear whether he engaged in the 
relevant misconduct: there is evidence to suggest that he did, but also 
evidence to support his earnest protestations of innocence. What 
should be done with him? The presumption of equality, if it has any 
force in cases like this, suggests that he should be punished like the 
others. But while that may eventually be our decision, it seems neither 
automatic nor obvious. If we decide to punish the fourth child too, it 
may be because we think more is to be gained in some sort of solidarity 
among the children, than lost in the possibly unjust application of a 
sanction for misbehavior. But where the sanction is a grave one, some 
other presumption (like the presumption of innocence) may come into 
effect, and that will dictate unequal treatment on precisely the grounds 
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- of uncertainty, and so on, that are supposed to trigger the demand 
for equality. Since the presumption of equal treatment is controversial 
in cases like this, it cannot be invoked to explain the negative connota-
tions of "unequal." 
So W esten's explanation of what he calls "the persuasiveness of 
equality" (p. 257) is necessarily an exercise in rhetorical pathology. 
The language of equality adds little of substance to any political 
claims; nevertheless, "expressing claims in the language of equality 
tends to invest them with greater weight than stating them in alterna-
tive modes" (p. xviii). 
Westen considers a number of explanations for this pathology. 
The first is that "equality," like "justice," is an evaluative term. He 
rejects this explanation, saying that "equality" is a word "which tends 
to have favorable connotations without being defined as having 
favorable connotations" (p. 261). Because the term's definition does 
not account for its uses to show approval, it is not an evaluative term. 
But his discussion here is embarrassingly weak. It ignores the connec-
tion between use and meaning that characterizes almost all post-
Wittgensteinian accounts of language. Westen simply asserts, without 
explanation, that how a word is "defined" is one thing, and how it is 
used is another. He does not explain how these two things - a word's 
definition and a word's typical use - can come apart. In addition, he 
offers no account of what it is for a term to be an evaluative term. 
There is only one reference (p. 161) in the book to Charles Stevenson's 
account of emotive language,21 and that is incidental to an attack on a 
specific egalitarian argument; it is not deployed where it could be of 
some help, in the discussion of rhetorical force. There is no appeal to 
Austin's idea of "illocutionary force"22 or to Hare's account of "pre-
scriptive language"23 to elucidate these mysteries. Philosophers have 
thought about the nature of evaluative language, and it is a mistake for 
Westen to ignore their ideas. 
Still, his claim is probably correct: "equality" is not an evaluative 
term. What that means (and what Westen fails to explain) is that, 
unlike terms such as "right," "good," and "just," the term "equal" is 
not used for the purpose of commending some social or political ar-
rangement. Instead, it denotes a feature of social or political arrange-
ments in virtue of which people use another term (like "good" or 
"just") to commend such arrangements. "Equality" is used, in other 
words, to identify properties on which commendations would super-
vene. What is to be explained, then, is the common assumption in the 
21. See C. STEVENSON, The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms, & Persuasive Definitions, in 
FACTS AND VALUES (1963). 
22. See J. AUSTIN, How TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS (2d ed. 1975). 
23. See R. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS 1-16 (1952). 
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rhetoric of politics that the putative equality of an arrangement is a 
good-making property rather than a bad-making property. 
Some parts of Westen's explanation are less convincing than 
others. He says that people who use the term "equal" trade on a cer-
tain fact about arithmetic: mathematical entities that are equal in one 
respect are necessarily equal in others. "To the extent that people ac-
cept mathematical equality as the paradigm for other equalities, there-
fore, they will be inclined to assume that people who are prescriptively 
equal in one respect are prescriptively equal in other respects" (p. 
265). But until I read Chapter Two of W esten's book I had not given 
any thought to this aspect of arithmetical theory; even now I think I 
should need expert guidance from philosophers and mathematicians 
on the point.24 It seems quite far-fetched to say that my openness to 
egalitarian argument is explained by my readiness to make fallacious 
inferences from arithmetical theorems with which, like most liberals, I 
am unacquainted. 
Another explanation for equality's rhetorical force is that claims 
about "equality" are characteristically made in a way that allows them 
to be all things to all people: 
[O]ne cannot meaningfully assert a "right" without specifying more or 
less precisely who is entitled to what from whom. Nor can one meaning-
fully assert a prescriptive "freedom" without specifying more or less pre-
cisely who ought to be unconstrained by what to do what. Yet speakers 
regularly assert B and A to be equal, without specifying anything about 
the respect in which they are equal . . . . [p. 269] 
But W esten's claims about "rights" and "freedom" here are quite 
controversial. Some theorists argue that the concept of a free man is 
prior to any precise determination of what counts as a constraint on 
what action.25 And Neil MacCormick has shown that people can talk 
meaningfully about rights in advance of determining who they are 
rights against.26 Indeed we sometimes use the idea of a right-bearer, 
or the idea of some very abstract right (such as the right to basic 
human respect), or the idea of freedom, as fundamental premises in 
political philosophy from which more concrete conclusions may be 
generated. The same, I argued in the previous section, may be true of 
equality. In other words, the openness and abstraction of egalitarian 
talk may be nothing more than a legitimate feature of its philosophical 
use. 
There is a general point to be made here. Too much of Westen's 
24. Westen cites G. FREGE, GRUNDGESETZE DER ARITHMETIK (1893), and B. RUSSBLL, 
PRINCIPLES OF MATHBMATICS (2d ed. 1938), in support of his view, which amounts, he says, to 
the claim that the relation of equality in mathematics is reflexive. P. 47. 
25. See, for example Isaiah Berlin's "Introduction" to his collection, I. BERLIN, FOUR Es· 
SAYS ON LIBERTY xliii (1969). 
26. MacCormick, Rights in Legislation, in LA w, MORALITY AND SOCIETY: EssA YS IN 
HONOR OF H.L.A. HART 189, 200-03 (P. Hacker & J. Raz eds. 1977). 
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book is premised on the assumption that precision and detailed specifi-
cation are crucial in political theory. In fact they are crucial at some 
levels and in some types of arguments, and not at others. If we adopt 
a very precisely formulated principle, it behooves us to adduce argu-
ments as to why precisely this principle, rather than some slightly dif-
ferent one, should be adopted. Those arguments are likely to be more 
broadly formulated: it is concerns of this or that abstract kind that 
have led us to want to pin things down in this way. The theorist's task 
is as much to explore the general features of these broad concerns as to 
pin down the precise formulation of the more detailed principles that 
they dictate. I hope it is not unfair to repeat that there is more than a 
whiff of legalism in the implication, pervading W esten's book, that 
nothing that is not precisely formulated can possibly be of interest in 
political thinking. Not every form of vagueness is a pernicious form of 
ambiguity; not every instance of formulaic elusiveness is a case of 
equivocation. We have tasks to perform in political theory that are 
different from those of the drafter or the legislator. 
Westen's other explanations of egalitarian rhetoric are more inter-
esting. Claims about equality are often equivocal as between descrip-
tion and prescription, giving rise perhaps to the misleading impression 
that "equality" can bridge the gulf between "is" and "ought" without 
having to make an independent case for the "ought" (p. 266). This is 
not merely because "equality" is a concept, like "courage," that brings 
normative and descriptive criteria together. (The whole point of the 
descriptive/evaluative nexus in the case of "courage" is to express, in 
the use of one word, a complete principle of virtue.) It is partly be-
cause even in its descriptive use, "equal" must be taken to connote to 
"equal in some respect that interests us,'' and so already implies nor-
mative connotations of relevance. And it is also because when we 
enunciate a principle such as "Equals should be treated equally,'' the 
first occurrence of the word, which seems descriptive, is in fact already 
expressing a prescriptive standard: "Those who· are equal in the re-
spects relevant to the way in which they should be treated (in this con-
text) should be treated equally." Westen's analysis along these lines 
{pp. 186-94 and elsewhere), is one of the most interesting and helpful 
arguments in the book. 
Likewise, when someone says, "These two people are being treated 
unequally," she may appear to be merely drawing attention to some 
difference in the way they are being treated - drawing attention to it 
purely as an observation without any hint of criticism. But, as Westen 
argues, "unequally" usually connotes much more than this {pp. 274-
80). It is reserved for cases where two people are being treated differ-
ently notwithstanding the fact that they are indistinguishable by refer-
ence to the criteria that are normatively relevant for the treatment in 
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question.27 So we have a term which (a) might be used simply to de-
scribe, without prejudice, a difference in the way people are being 
treated, but which (b) is characteristically used to complain about a 
failure to apply appropriate standards. The slippage from (a) to (b) 
creates some rhetorical advantage in favor of those who, for whatever 
reason, have an interest in complaining about differences in the way 
people are treated. 
Still, W esten's account of the rhetoric of equality is missing some-
thing. He tries to explain the rhetorical force of "equal" and "une-
qual" in terms of verbal slippage, fallacious inference, equivocation, 
and ambiguity. But none of those explanations accounts for the power 
and importance of the ideal of equality or the accusation of inequality. 
All they explain is our readiness to move from more plausible to less 
plausible claims about identity and difference. That gap in Westen's 
account and others like it is going to remain until they acknowledge 
that equality also functions in political philosophy as a deep and im-
portant justificatory idea, as well as a term for formulating surface 
positions. I certainly do not want to suggest that every occurrence of 
the word is appropriately invested with the importance accorded to 
the deeper idea outlined in Part II. Westen is right: a lot of putatively 
egalitarian talk is fallacious and confused. But until we understand 
the force that is legitimately associated with the idea in some of its 
philosophical uses, we will not understand why it is a fallacy to invoke 
that force in other more superficial contexts. For this reason, Wes-
ten's final chapter on rhetoric suffers, like the rest of the book, from a 
failure to take seriously the possibility that equality functions as a deep 
and abstract ideal in political justification. 
IV 
Part of the frustration one feels with Speaking of Equality is that 
there are some interesting ambiguities in the surface use of the terms 
"equal" and "unequal," but that many of these are simply not ex-
plored in Westen's study. 
Consider the following table summarizing data about median 
household incomes by race in the United States in 1950 and 1975, in 
constant 1967 dollars:2s 
Year 
1950 
1975 
Median income 
for blacks 
$2592 
$5452 
Median income 
for whites 
$4778 
$8860 
27. Westen attributes this point to John Hart Ely. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A 
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 32 (1980). For some reason this book is referred to repeatedly on 
pp. 279-80 as ''Democracy and Dissent." 
28. The table is taken from Douglas Rae and others. D. RAE, D. YATES, J. HOCHSCHILD, J, 
MORONE & C. FESSLER, EQUALmES 111 (1981). 
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Have the median incomes become more equal or less equal by 1975? 
Has inequality increased or diminished? 
The questions are simply ambiguous, for several different things 
have happened so far as the income disparity is concerned. On the one 
hand, the real dollar gap between the incomes has increased. On the 
other hand, the median black income in 1975 is a greater fraction of 
the median white income than it was in 1950. Which of these is the 
better measure of (in)equality? There is no sense to the question. 
Both propositions are true, and each might be thought relevant for 
some reason. An increasing gap might indicate a greater disparity of 
consumption patterns and lifestyle, and thus raise concerns about 
social solidarity. An increasing ratio, however, answers slightly 
different concerns about relative economic power and the ability to 
deploy economic assets to obtain political or other positional 
advantage. The figures indicate that the danger associated with 
disparate economic power and political advantage may have 
diminished a little even while the danger to social solidarity has gon:e 
up. Other putative measures of inequality may tell a different story 
again. By the maxim.in criterion, a distribution counts as more equal if 
the real position of the less advantaged party has improved. Once 
more, there is no point to asking whether or not this captures the 
"true" meaning of "equality." The point is simply that an 
improvement on this criterion will certainly be of interest to anyone 
whose "egalitarianism" is based on a concern about sheer poverty and 
need. 
These ambiguities are real, not verbal. They betoken differences of 
interest, not merely differences of formulation. They raise questions 
about why we are concerned with equality and inequality, and they 
reach the unsurprising answer that people's interests in the 
distribution of income are multiple and diverse, for there are a variety 
of ways in which income distribution affects other factors in society. 
For reasons that are not indicated in the book, Peter Westen says 
nothing about any of this.29 Instead, the chapter devoted to "Per-
Capita Distributions" is taken up with such insights as the following. 
Even if A and B each receive 3 cc. of a certain vaccine, we cannot say 
that A's dose is identical in all respects to B's dose, because it is a fact 
about A's dose that it goes into the mouth of A and that is not true of 
B's dose (p. 154). It is hard to resist the conclusion that the author is 
unwilling to consider which ambiguities are important and which 
unimportant. Any ambiguity is worth invoking if it contributes to the 
allegation of conceptual imprecision. Any opportunity for deeper 
29. He cites Rae's book several times, but makes no reference to Rae's extraordinarily 
instructive discussion of tbe relations between tbese various criteria. He does not even mention 
Rae's suggestion -·which one would have thought congenial - tbat conventional social science 
measures of inequality, such as tbe Gini coefficient, "[r]esolve [a]ll of tbe [a]bove by [m]eans 
[w]ell-[k]nown to [o]striches." Id. at 121. 
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discussion is worth overlooking if it conveys the impression that 
equality is worth talking about. 
It may seem that I have concentrated unfairly in this review on the 
analytic side of W esten's argument: his account of the way the term 
"equality" is and should be used, rather than his substantive critique 
of egalitarian ideals. The trouble is that the book does not really have 
a substantive side. In some works, the exposure of the ambiguity of 
the term "equality" is presented as a prelude to a more substantial 
attack on particular egalitarian doctrines, or as an analytic 
prolegomenon to a deeper discussion of less equivocal principles and 
values. 30 That is not the case here. The author does use a large 
number of examples, many of them taken from American 
constitutional law - nondiscrimination doctrines, equal protection 
cases, and the like. But they are used simply as examples of the 
difficulty of construing phrases like "equal opportunity" and "treat 
like cases alike." Anyone who comes to this book expecting that its 
300 pages will contain sustained discussion of issues like those 
intimated in my first four cases will be disappointed. 
I noted at the beginning of the review that Westen says he is 
"deeply committed" to many of the social causes that are put forward 
under the slogan of "equality" (p. 287). But he is not interested in 
saying very much about those causes. The arguments he makes are 
not calculated to advance them; on the contrary, they are, he says, 
"arguments that will tend to inhibit my ideological friends (as I feel 
myself being inhibited) from resorting to 'equality' to expound values 
we happen to share" (p. 287). He is not even interested in showing 
that the use of egalitarian rhetoric in a good cause might lead to its use 
(by others) in a bad cause. The only case he makes is that the rhetoric 
itself is analytically disreputable. 
So I do not think it unfair to say that W esten's book is primarily a 
discussion of words, written with very little sense of why words 
matter. If that seems unfair, then let the closing sentence of the book 
speak for itself: "To this I can only respond that I have tried to say 
true things about how a commonplace word significantly affects our 
moral and legal thinking, and that I take the pursuit of knowledge to 
be a virtue which is second to none" (p. 288). 
30. See, e.g, A. FLEW, THE PoLmcs OF PROCRUSTES (1981); J, LUCAS, ON JUsrtCE (1980). 
